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Article 2

Events Impacting Lodging Capital Flow
Abstract

By reviewing events in the last quarter of the 20th century that have impacted the amount and type of lodging
industry financing, the author analyzes these historical trends and major events to alert lodging industry
investors, lenders, legislators, and hotel operators when similar events emerge in the future

This article is available in Hospitality Review: https://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/hospitalityreview/vol19/iss1/2

Events have impact
on lodging industry finance
by A. J. Singh

stopped supplying capital to the
industry. At the end of each cycle the
lodging industry emerged a little
different from the previous decade.
The purpose of this study was
to identfi the critical events that
iduenced availability of capital to
the U. S. lodging industry in this
period and to discuss the structural
s the lodging industry changes to the lodging industry and
moves into the 21st century, lodging industry finance in each
it faces many uncertainties. progressive decade. The study is
These uncertainties are based on historical research and relies upon
the underlying premise that the secondary literature. Commenting
lodging industry is dependent upon on historical research, Baumfinancing for its growth and devel- gartner stated, Wsing the historopment. Various recent studies ical approach, the researcher
have tried to alleviate these uncer- endeavors to record and undertainties by predicting the extent stand events of the past. In turn,
and nature of capital availability to interpretations of recorded history
the lodging industry in the future.' hold to provide better underThe last three decades of the standing of the present and suggest
20th century (1970-1999) have possible future directions." '
witnessed three capital market
The relationship between
cycles; the peaks represented capital availability and room starts
capital availability to the lodging has been well documented. Figure 1
industry and the troughs signiiied illustrates the close relationship
periods when lenders and investors between the availability of capital

Eyrevieb%hgevenk in the last quarter of the
2Mh century that have impacted the amounl
and fype of lodging industry financing, the
author analyzes these historical trends and
major events to alert lodging industry
investors, lenders, legislators, and hotel
operators when simikr events emerge in
the future.
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and room starts (one measure of
lodging industry growth). For
example, convenient access to
capital through the mortgage REI%
of the early 1970s pushed room
starts in 1973 to 155,400.
Conversely, in the early 1990s, as
capital availability tightened, room
starts declined. As capital availability increased in the second half
of the 1990s, room starts also
picked up.
Events have impact
Over the past 30 years, many
interrelated events have had an
impact on the availability of capital
to the lodging industry. Each event
culminated in a critical event that
directly impacted the increase or
decrease of debt and equity capital
to the lodging industry. A review of
these critical events and their
impact on the lodging industry is
discussed in the context of the
three decades.

1970s are boom time
Critical event 1-REITs:
During the late 1960s, as investors
were not able to achieve adequate
returns from stocks, they looked to
real estate as a hedge against inflation. An efficient means of investing
in real estate that developed during
this period is known as the real
estate investment trust (REIT).The
REITs that financed the real estate
boom of the early 1970s were mortgage REITs, as opposed to the
equity REITs of the 1990s.
Mortgage REITs were essentially lenders, and in the early 1970s
they were responsible for providing
first and second mortgages,
construction and development
loans, and joint venture loans for
hotel development. These REITs
raised capital by selling shares to
the public, issuing commercial
paper, and borrowing from banks.
It is estimated that between 1969
and 1972 the REPT industry sold

Figure 1
U.S. lodging industry room starts compared
to availability of capital (1967-1999)

I

I

PficewateiiIouse Coopers, The WEFA Group. Adapted from Global Lodging
Almanac by Bear Stearns (m).
Source:
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securities worth $1 billion to $2
billion each year."
An advantage of these lending
institutions over traditional
lenders was that they were relatively unregulated. As the spread
of rates a t which they made their
loans and their own cost of capital
increased, their share prices
showed dramatic increases in the
early 1970s. The national stagflation (caused by simultaneous
increase of both price level and
unemployment rate) of 1974
destroyed the mortgage REITs
because, as their cost of borrowing
increased, they were unable to get
adequate returns on their loans
and, as the REITs became nnprofitable, they were unable to attract
investors to buy their shares. This
problem was further exacerbated
by the highly leveraged nature of
the mortgage REITE;in some cases
their debt-to-equity ratio was as
high as 4:1."rom
a peak of 200
REITs in 1974, their number was
reduced to less than 100 by the end
of the decade."
In the early 19706, mortgage
REITs (and other lenders) kept
developers supplied with capital
for development. As a result, the
supply of rooms showed a large
increase during this period. In
competition with these REITs,
commercial banks, savings-andloan associations, and other
lending institutions made loans
that exceeded prudent levels.
A study by Laventhol &
Honvath, a premier lodging
industry consulting firm, during
this period summarizes the effects

of overbuilding when the environment changed:"
During 1973-1974, overbuilding
i n the hospitality field was
aggravated by several unexpected factors. First, the
energy crisis reduced travel.
Second, developers were hit
with staggering construction
cost increases and cost overruns. Third, interest rates went
up. With soaring costs crimping
their profits, many developers
had decided to wait for the
widely-predicted lowering of
long-term interest rates.
Accordingly, many projects
were undertaken without longterm mortgage commitments,
and certain lenders flush with
cash-notably REITs-did not
discourage the practice. The
Federal
Reserve
Board,
however, in a n attempt to
dampen the country's rampant
inflation, began to tighten the
money supply and interest rates
reacted appropriately (went
up), catching builders with
high-cost long-term financing,
or-worsenone a t all. Fourth,
as the recession started to take
hold, consumer confidence
began to wither and demand
for real estate projects of all
sorts evaporated.
Because of this hostile environment, lenders became owners
of non-performing lodging properties. Loan write-offs continued to
increase. REITs started to fail due
to their over-leveraged position.
Besides REITs. other lenders also
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could pay on deposits, they were at
a competitive disadvantage from
the newly emerging money-market
mutual funds, which paid a much
1980s show change
higher market rate. The result of
Critical events 2, 3-Deregulation: Until the early 1980s, this was disintermediation or Loss
savings-and-loan institutions or of depositors and hence erosion of
S&Ls primarily financed housing their capital base.
In an attempt to counter this
through traditional mortgages at
fixed interest rates for the duration problem, Congress set into motion
of the loan. These long-term loans the deregulation of depository insti(30years) were primarily funded by tutions by passing the Depository
short-term deposits. Moreover, Institutions Deregulation and
regulations at this time (based on Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA,
Regulation Q: A regulation of the 1980) and Garn-St. Germain Act of
Federal Reserve for depository 1982. These two acts expanded the
institutions) imposed interest-rate deposit-taking and asset-investceilings on these deposits. Under ment powers of S&Ls. They were
conditions of stable interest rates now able to offer deposits at higher
this is not a problem, but if interest rates of interest and make
rates rise above the interest rate on consumer and commercial loans
the mortgage loans, a negative through adjustable-rate mortgages.
For many institutions, dereguspread results for the institution.
This is what happened from 1979 to lation made them safer and more
1982 when the Federal Reserve diversified. However, for a signifiradically changed its monetary cant number of S&Ls, whose earnpolicy by targeting bank reserves ings and shareholder capital were
rather than interest rates in an being depleted in traditional l i e s
attempt to lower the rate of infla- of business, it meant the opportution.' Due to this restrictive mone- nity to take more risks in an
tary policy, there was a surge in attempt to return to profitability.As
interest rates, with rates on T-bills a result, many S&Ls made highrisk loans-acquisition and develrising to as high as 16 percent.
This increase in short-term opment loans and construction
rates and the cost of funds had two loans on "location-oriented busieffects on S&Ls.First, as they were nesses" such as hotels, resorts, golf
saddled with fixed-rate, long-term courses, and fast-food restaurants?
At first the deregulated climate
home mortgages, their earnings
spread became negative, as their improved the profitability of the
cost of funds was higher than what industry. However, in 1984, a
they were receiving from the regional economic crisis began to
interest on home mortgages. unfold in Texas as crude oil prices
Second, due to Regulation Q, which began to fall, which caused enorrestricted the interest rate they mous declines in real estate values.
suffered losses on commercial real
estate and hotel loans.
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Congress passed the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and
Enforcement Act (FIRREA) in 1989.
The two main tasks of this act were
to once again regulate S&Ls (by
establishing strict capital standards) and to establish the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC),
which was designed to take over
failed S&Ls and dispose of their
assets.
Critical event 44helters:
Prior to the passage of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, real estate
limited partnerships were a
popular way to raise capital. This
was
done through the
process of syndication. In a syndicate, a group of investors pool their
capital for investment in real
estate.'O Two primary types of
syndicate
structures
were
commonly used: a single-class
syndicate, in which each investor
receives a pro rata ownership
interest in the syndicate for a onetime investment in cash, and a
multi-class syndicate, in which
investors awn different classes of
shares.
Prior to the passage of TRA,
syndicate structures were set up
mainly as a tax-sheltered way to
invest in hotel real estate. The
reversal of the tax advantages as a
result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986
resulted in an increase in depreciation schedules from 18 years to 31.5
years, investment tax credit was
repealed and passive investment
losses could no longer shield earned
income." Hotel projects, which were
initiated prior to the passage of the
s~tuation, TRA, were conceived as tax-shel-

This crisis spread to other parts of
the nation. National delinquency
rates on mortgages increased from
2.1 percent in 1983 to 5 percent in
1986.' Hindsight has shown that
thls loss of asset quality by the
S&Ls was caused by the regulatory
environment, which permitted
them access to new areas in which
they had no experience. The FSLIC
(the insurer of S&Ls) accentuated
this risk-taking behavior because it
did not peg its insurance premium
to the risk profile of the S&L,nor did
it close down capilal-depleted institutions.
Abundant capltal from S&Ls,
along with favorable accounting
rules (allowing shorter depreciation periods) and tax incentives to
invest in commercial real estate
provided by ERTA (the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 19811, resulted
in a massive hotel construction
boom. The Tax Reform Act of 1986
(TRA) took away the previous benefits accorded by ERTA. As Arnold
(1994) states:
The passage of TRA had an
instantaneous and devastating
effect on the real estate industry.
Construction for many types of
real estate (including hotels)
virtually halted. Default rates
increased to record levels. In
many cases, it became apparent
that many thrift institutions,
lacking experience in making
real estate and construction
loans, had accumulated portfolios with such a large percentage
of bad loans that default was
inevitable.
To

rectify
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tered vehicles. As such the reversal
resulted in an excess inventory of
unprofitable hotels as the 1980s
came to a close.

rates had come down, hotel loans
were still difficult to obtain. Since
capital was difficult to obtain,
investors had to use more of their
own equity to secure loans, which
lowered loan-to-value ratios.
The 1990s are overbuilt
The true nature of the real
Critical event 5-Excess:
Excess room inventory, the estate "credit crunch" during
declining value of hotel real estate, 1992-1993 is summed up in a
the inability of hotels to meet debt research newsletter by Grubb &
service, the S&L debacle, and a Ellis, a real estate advisory firm:
national recession all combined to "The truth seems to be that the
shut off funding for hotel projects in crisis in real estate finance, where
the early 1990s. In particular, tradi- it exists, is not a crisis born of a
tional lenders such as commercial shortage of loan funds. Instead it is
banks, life insurance companies, one of confidence, on the part of
and S&Ls stopped lending on hotel both lenders and buyers, in the
projects. A survey of lenders in 1990 integrity of investment real estate
by Hospitality Valuation Services'" in a severely overbuilt market.""
Critical event 6-Alternaindicated that only 33 percent of
lenders would consider new hotel tives: From 1990 to 1993, when
loans. The remaining lenders traditional hotel financing sources
stated that new hotel loans were too curtailed their lending in the overrisky. These lenders did not plan to built commercial real estate
return to hotel lending in the near market, alternative sources of
future. This was a period when financing emerged to partially fill in
lenders were more concerned with the gap and also take advantage of
disposing off the non-performing the depressed values of hotel real
hotels that they were forced to estate.
Finance
companies,
acquire, or working with hotel charging very high rates of interest,
owners to restructure their loans.
were the main providers of capital.
The investment climate during These companies were called
the early 1990s is reflected in an 'lenders of last resort" primarily
investment survey conducted by because of their high financing
PKF Consulting during this costs. They were appropriate when
period.'" (See Table 1.)The survey funds needed were for existing propindicates the increased risk of a erties with appreciation potential.
hotel investment, which is reflected
A review of the Crittenden
in higher interest rates, capitaliza- Report on Real Estate Financing
tion rates, debt coverage ratios, from 1990-1993 revealed some of
loan-to-value ratios, return require- the early finance companies
ments, and other investment and involved with hotel lending were
lending criteria. It should be noted G.E. Capital, Heller Financial,
that although by 1992 interest Security Pacific, Barclays American
FZU Hospitality Review
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Table 1
Investment criteria
(1986-1 992)
1986

1988

1990

1992

Overall cap rate . . . . . . . . .10.90% . . .11.10% . . . .10.20% . . .11.90%
Discount rate (IRR) . . . . . .13.80%. . . .14.60% . . . .15.0% . . . .16.0%
Holding period (yrs) . . . . . . .9.3 . . . . . . .8.8 . . . . . . .9.6 . . . . . 2 . 4
Debt coverage ratio . . . . . . . .1.30 . . . . . .1.30 . . . . . .1.30 . . . . .1.60
Income growth rate . . . . . . .4.00% . . . . .4.40% . . . . .4.80% . . . .3.80%
Expense growth rate . . . . . . .4.30% . . . . .4.30% . . . . .4.70% . . . .3.60%
Interest rate . . . . . . . . . . . .10.18 . . . . .11.6% . . . . .11.5%. . . . .8.9%
Loan to value . . . . . . . . . . .72.5%. . . . .73.6% . . . . .69.0% . . . .67.4%
Source: PKF Consulting
--

and Money Store, PMC Capital, I'IT
Small Business Finance and Westinghou~e.'~
Some of these companies, specifically the Money Store,
PMC capital and
Small Business Finance, worked closely with
the Small BusinessAdmmstration
as providers of SBA guaranteed
commercial mortgages. While
foreign commercial banks were
more willing than domestic banks
to provide financing to the hotel
industry, even they were beginning
to reduce their exposure to the
industry.I6
However, three new sources 01
financing emerged during this
period:
opportunity funds
evolution of the secondary
mortgage market, the securitization of commercial realestate,
including hotels, and the
creation of new h a n c i n g structures (CMBSs, CMOS, and
PW\bTPel

'LUI.LIU0,

equity real estate investment
trusts (equity REITs)

Opportunity funds defined
Opportunity funds are still
loosely defined in the hotel real
estate industry. However, Richard
G. Carlson, of DeloiLte & Touche, a
consulting firm, defines them as "a
source of capital that has a
contrarian investment focus on
under-performing properties and
loans."" Investment banks are the
source of most of these funds, but in
some cases the source of these
funds may be a company with an
opportunistic focus. These entities
acquire under-performing hotel
properties or other forms of real
estate and loans, with the purpose
of turning around the investments
through repositioning, restructuring, or updating, and then
waiting for the market to improve.
The long-term objective of these
funds is to buy properties a t rock
bottom prices or at times when
capital is scarce, hold the investments for a few years, and then sell
them at much higher
- urioes. thus
reaping huge profits on the assets.
Many opportunity funds
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started in 1990 when the Resolution Trust Corporation was
disposing of the real estate assets of
failed S&Ls. The majority of their
early acquisitions occurred during
the period from 1990-1992, generally considered to be the bottom of
the real estate cycle. Investors in
these funds may include institutions, such as pension funds, or
high-net-worth individuals. The
high yields (20 to 25 percent) and
the passive nature of the investment were the primary motivations
for investors in these funds. Some
examples of opportunistic investing
that went directly to the hotel
industry can be seen in Table 2.
Generally speaking, opportu-

nity funds are not currently very
active as a funding source in the
hotel industry. Those that still exist
have been transformed into some
form of acquisition fund, because as
the prices of hotel real estate
continue to rise, the opportunities
to purchase at deep discounts have
been reduced.
Markets are broadened
Amajor change in the way that
commercial real estate in general
and hotel real estate in particular
is being currently financed is the
linkage of the originators of mortgage loans with the broader capital
markets. Colloquially this is also
referred to the linkage of "Main

Table 2
Opportunistic investments in the hotel industry
Year

Investor

Acquisition

Value

143 hotels frum RTC

1992

Ashford Financial
and Fisher Family

$380 million
(57 percent discount)

1993

Colony Capital, Hilton
Hotels and Pan Global

Hyatt Regency Waikoloa
(1,241 room resort)

$55 million
(85 percent discount)

1993

KSL Recreation
(Created by Kohlberg,
Kravis and Roberts, the
LBO firm)

La Quinta Resort and
PGA West

$276.4 million
(57 percent discount)

1993

Morgan Stanley Real
Estate Fund

Cannel Valley Resort and
Dora1 Telluride Resort &
Spa. Red Roof Inns

NIA

1994

Asbford Financial,
Fisher Family and
George Soros

14 Howard Johnsons and
three full-service hotels

NIA

1994

Interstone Partners
(JVbetween Interstate
Hotels and Blackstone
Gmup)

3 M-service hotels

NIA

1994

Stanvood Capital

Interests in 8000 rooms

NIA

Source Rob& G. H a r p
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Street with Wall Street." This
linkage started with the development of a secondary market for real
estate. Until the 1970s, when a
bank or another financial institution originated a loan, it was held
on its balance sheet until the loan
was paid off. The secondary market
in real estate began when lenders
in a particular geographical area,
who had more available capital
than demand for it, bought mortgages from lenders in geographical
areas that had a shortage of capital.
This secondary market received
further impetus when the RTC in
the early 1990s acquired failed
S&Ls and banks and sold off nonperforming mortgages.
"Securitization" is a process by
which an asset, such as a mortgage, is standardized into individual units, such as shares. An
investor in these shares is a partial
owner of a large pool of mortgages.
The direct-sale program started to
revolutionize mortgage lending by
letting the mortgage originator
remove mortgages off its books and
sell them to another party.
However, the creation of securities
carried the revolution to greater
heights by converting the mortgage instrument into a packaged
product, which could then be sold
in an organized market just like a
stock or bond.
The securitization of real
estate is part of the new advances
in finance called "financial engineering," which John Finnerty
says "involves the design, the
development, and the implementation of innovative financial instru-

ments and processes, and the
formulation of creative solutions to
problems in finance.""
The key words in the definition
include creative and innovative.
This type of creativity was first
seen in the creation of products
such as the swap, zero coupons
bonds, junk bonds, and-in the
case of the securitization of real
estak+the first mortgage-backed
securities. Starting with the first
plain vanilla CMBS or commercial
mortgage-backed securities, these
instruments evolved into more
sophisticated forms such as CMOs
or Collateralized Mortgage Obligations, and REMICs or Real Estate
Mortgage Investment Conduits.
While similar in concept, each of
these securities was designed to
suit different investors and structured to improve tax efficiency.
RElTs re-emerge
The securitization of real estate
was one of the solutions to the
problem of scarcity of capital for
commercial real estate, in general,
and hotels, in particular, during the
early 1990s. Selling debt securities
(CMBSs and CMOs) to the broader
public market increased the flow of
capital to the lodging industry. On
the equity side, another solution to
the scarcity of capital during this
period was offered by the reemergence of real estate investment
trusts (REITs).
The equity REITs of the 1990s
were different fmm the mortgage
REITs of the 1970s, however. While
both mortgage REITs and equity
REITs sold shares to individuals
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and institutions, the former were
akin to banks because they used the
funds to make loans, while equity
REITs are akin to corporations
because they are investment vehicles that use the funds to acquire or
construct hotels.
The New York Institute of
Finance (1988) states:
A REIT may be a corporation,
business trust, or association
primarily developed to own or
finance real estate. As with
most corporations, a board of
directors or trustees elected by
shareholders sets policy and
arranges the day-to-day operation of the REIT by professional
managers or advisors. Persons
with real estate experience,
such as real estate brokers or
mortgage bankers, organize
many REITS. They may also be
organized by commercial hanks
or insurance companies.""
Once legally organized, an
equity REIT begins its existence by
issuing shares of stocks. To
purchase properties, equity REPm
sell securities to institutional
investors, issue commercial paper,
and borrow from banks. Traditional
equity REIT investments include
the purchase of office buildings,
apartments, shopping centers,
warehouses, and hotels. REIT
shares trade on the major stock
exchanges. This provides liquidity
to the holders of REIT shares.
Besides being a type of mutual
fund for purchasing real estate
and being organized like a corporation, REITS are also intended to
be a tax "conduit" or pass-through,

according to section 856-60 of the
Internal Revenue Code. This
means that REITs are exempt from
wrporate income tax as long as
they distribute 95 percent of their
income to their stockholders.
REITs as they are known today
emerged in the early 1990s. Kimco
Realty, a regional-mall REIT, was
the pioneer in the field with its
public offering in November 1991.
In fact, the asset class that led the
cmergence of equity REITs was
regional malls. As the operating
performance of hotels improved,
they became the next target for
REITS."
RFS Hotel Investors was the
first of the modern hotel industry
REITs, with its initial public
off'ering in August 1993. Jameson
Inns, Equity Inns, Winston Hotels,
Felcor Suites, and Innkeepers USA
followed in 1994, and Stanvood
Lodging Trust in 1995. Arnold
states that the resurgence of equity
REITs in the 1990s can be traced to
three primary motivation^:^^
As the traditional financing
sources such as banks, S&Ls, and
insurance companies stopped
funding commercial real estate
(including hotels), a vacuum was
created. As a result, real estate
developers, managers, and owners
saw REITS as a means to raise
capital and finance growth.
The demand for REITS also
came from institutional investors
such as mutual funds and pension
funds. These investors wanted to
continue investing in real estate
but needed an exit strategy. Securitization and investment in REIT
FIU Hospitality Review
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shares provided the ideal solution.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986
took away the tax shelter advantages of investing in commercial
real estate, including hotels. At the
same time, the tax shelter partnerships and syndicates that were
formed prior to the passage of the
act were no longer the ideal business format for investing in real
estate. Furthermore, there was an
excess inventory of real estate,
resulting in unprofitable operations
and the eventual decline in the
value of real estate, including
hotels, by the early 1990s. During
this period, many investors wanted
to purchase hotels and other real
estate because of these reduced
values. Since traditional capital
sources were not available, and the
previously used limited-partnership formats were not suitable for
raising capital, REIm became the
vehicle of choice for raising capital
to make real estate purchases. In
fact, many of the early hotel REITs
got their start by buying hotels in
this overbuilt environment at 50
cents on the dollar.
Three forms of RElTs exist

There are typically three forms
of REIT structures. In the traditional structure, the REIT owns the
real estate (hotels,apartments, and
office buildings), and these are then
leased to a lessee, who arranges
management and franchise agreements. A paired-share REIT pairs a
REIT with a C-Carp (public corporation). This combined company is
then traded as one. This integrated
structure is advantageous to

investors because the REIT leases
the hotel properties to the C-Carp,
which then is the operating
company and the franchisor; this
structure avoids what is termed in
the industry "leakage," meaning
loss of income due to the management contract and franchise agreement, which otherwise are typically
given to another company.
As a result of the IRS Restructuring Bill passed by the U. S.
Congress in August 1998, paired
share RElTs will not enjoy the tax
advantages associated with their
unique structure for future acquisitions. In anticipation of this
announcement, Starwood Lodging,
the largest lodging equity REIT,
gave up its paired share status and
converted to a tax paying C-Corp."
The third type of REIT, similar
to a paired-share REIT, is known as
a paper-clip REP. The main difference between the two is that pairedshare REITs trade the shares in the
REIT and the C-Carp as one integrated share, while a paper-clip
REIT trades the shares in the RElT
and the C-Corp separately;
however, the REF and the C-Carp
have common management control.
From 1994to 1998,RElTs dominated the lodging industry as
owners of hotel properties and
companies. The superior performance of their stock and the tax
advantages enjoyed by their structure attracted public capital to fuel
their growth. Table 3 outlines the
lodging REnk and their acquisitions in 1997. Paine Webber
reported that REIT stocks were
down by about 19 percent in the
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first seven months of 1998." The
direct impact of declining stock
values for lodang REITS made it
difficult for them to find financing
to fuel their growth during this
period. This trcnd continued until
the end of 1999, in which year
REITS provided a total return of
-16.5 percent.
However, REITS rebounded in
2000 when total returns from
January to September have been
over 36 percent.'" While the total
number of REITs is about the same,
(as of the August 2000 there were
16 hotel REITs)," the total inventory of rooms they control and
overall market capitalization has
considerably reduced since the
thcir peak in 1997.As of September
11, 2000, lodging REIT market
capitalization was approximately
$8 billion."
In December 1999, the REIT
Modernization A d was signed into
law. As REITs have evolved over the
years into service-related real
estate owners, the new a d will

allow them to create subsidiaries,
which can provide value added
services to their lessees, hitherto
disallowed. Furthermore, the new
act is expected to reduce some of the
tax disadvantages of the present
REIT structure.'%e
new law goes
into effect in 2001.
Events impact capital
In the past 30 years various
interrelated critical events in the
external environment impacted the
availability of capital to the lodging
industry. In the 1970s inadequate
stock returns coupled with high
inflation led to the creation of the
Mortgage REIT. Monetary policies
enacted in the early 1980s to
combat Inflation led to interest rate
increases, which in turn resulted in
a competitive disadvantage for
depository institutions. To rectify
the situation, deregulation acts
were passed which increased the
scope of lending activities for
savings and loan institutions.
Lacking experience and proper

Table 3
Biggest RElT deals of 1997
Acquirer
Target
Amount in $millions
Stanvood Lodging . . . . . . . . . I'IT C o p . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $17,000.
Patriot American . . . . . . . . . .Interstate Hotels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,100.
Stanvood Lodging . . . . . . . . .Westin Hotels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,570.
Patriot American . . . . . . . . . .Wyndham Hotel Corp . . . . . . . . . . 1,100.
Patriot American . . . . . . . . . . Carnival Hotel and Resorts . . . . . . ,485.
Starwood Lodging . . . . . . . . .HE1 Hotels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,327.
.
Patriot American . . . . . . . . . .WHG Resorts & Casinos. . . . . . . . .,300.
Patriot American . . . . . . . . . .California Jockey Club . . . . . . . . . . ,238.
Patriot American . . . . . . . . . . Grand Heritage Hotels . . . . . . . . . . ..22.
Source. Cwpers & Lybrand
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credit checks, unrestricted capital
flowed to the lodging industry. In
conjunction with capital availability, favorable real estate taxation laws provided further incentive
to invest in hotel real estate. This
potent mixture resulted in a hotel
construction bubble, which burst at
the end of the 1980s;the "needlenin
this case was the removal of real
estate taxincentives, passage of the
Tax Reform Ad of 1986, and a
general recession engulfing the
nation. As a result the lodging
industry was clearly overbuilt going
into the 1990s.
The 1990s were a time of
tremendous change with regard to
financing the lodging industry. In
many ways changes in the past
decade were a response to events of
the 1980s.The decade began with a
period of capital scarcity due to
excesses of the 1980s. In response to
this shortage, investment banks
created
financially-engineered
products which included the
various debt securities using mortgage as a collateral. In addition,
equity capital was available with
the emergence of the REIT.

real estate or commercial mortgage) sources of capital are available to the industry. As the
availability of public capital from
both debt and equity slowed down
in 1999, so did the room starts. It is
interesting to note, however, that
when the public capital markets
started to decline in 1998, it
presented opportunities to the
traditional lenders (commercial
banks and life insurance companies) who stepped forward to fill the
vacuum. This is an interesting
change from financing earlier in the
decade at which time traditional
lenders stopped financing the
lodging industry and public capital
markets filled the vacuum.
In this current financing environment, where capital is available
from both public and private
sources, the financing environment
may be described as one of conservative competition between the
various sources of capital. This is
reflected in the changes in the
lending terms. While interest rates
have declined h m the mid-1990s,
as compared to the 1980s, lenders
are conservative in terms of their
debt coverage ratio and loan to
value ratios, which are more strinFinance is redesigned
In the 21st century, the interre- gent as compared to the 1980s.
With the introduction of securilated events and lessons learned in
the past three decades have tization of debt and equity, hotel
restructured capital sources and real estate investments do not cany
have redesigned lodging industry the same amount of risk. Instead of
investing in bricks and mortar,
finance in many ways.
Formerly, capital sources to the which are not liquid, investors have
lodging industry were primarily a more liquid investment with a
private, now both public (issuance better exit option. The ultimate
of debt and equity securities) and impact of these creative instruFIU Hospitality Review, Volume 19, Number 1, 2001
was
to bring flexibility to real
private (direct investment
hotel
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h w Rirfi;HighTild AitGmwXOppo3Unity (New York: New York Institute of
Finance, 1988).
R. A. Leflew, "Taking it to the REITs
Once Upon a Time: The History of REITs."
PKF 2Fends (1995):10-12.

estate investing, which makes
investing in real estate appeal to a
wider range of investors.
With the introduction of securitization, a new organization-the
rating agency- entered the hotelfinancing arena in the 1990s. One
of the main reasons for the overbuilding of the 1980s was a breakdown in loan quality by the banks
and thnfts. As each competed to
make loans and earn up-front fees,
their lending criteria began to be
less strict, which resulted in poorquality loans. The rating agencies
are expected to prevent an excess
flow of capital to the lodging
industry as they evaluate a potential issuer's credit quality (default
risk) and assign a rating based on
the issuer's business and market
sector (hotel, regional mall, warehouse), management asset quality,
and other financial mcasures such
as profitability, size, and leverage.'"
Therefore, it is expected that the
securitization process and the role
of the rating agencies will keep
capital flows in check.
Financing of the hotel industry
changed From being merely mortgage lending to what is called
"credit-based financing." In this
lending environment, loans are
more akin to corporate loans, in
which the borrower is treated as a
business. "Credit-based financing
takes into account not just the
value, cash flow, and risk profile of
a single property, but rather the
borrower's overall credit, based on
an evaluation of all the borrower's
assets and operati~ns.'~"
The profile of equity investors

in the 1990s has changed from
those in the 1980s. While limited
partnerships and syndication were
the dominant source of equity
capital in the 1980s, the 1990s
started with opportunity and acquisition funds buying depressed hotel
real estate; from the mid-to-late
1990s, hotel companies and REITs
hecame the major source of equity
capital. Today there are 29 public
hotel companies (C-Corps) and 15
equity RETTs that raise capital
through the issuance of equity and
debt. While this activity slowed
down in 1999, it still remains at
much higher levels than in the
1970s and 1980s.
As the financial services
industry continues to consolidate
and the last vestiges of the GlassSteagall act of 1933 continue to be
dismantled, the financial services
industry will have more flexibility
in their decision to lend and invest
in the lodging industry. This is
expected to positivcly impact
capital flow to the lodging industry.
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